CREATING AND REDUCING INTERGROUP CONFLICT: THE ROLE OF PERSPECTIVE-TAKING IN AFFECTING OUT-GROUP EVALUATIONS

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ABSTRACT

A full understanding of organizational and group effectiveness must take into the account the causes and contexts that exacerbate and reduce tension between groups, and the individual psychological mechanisms involved. This chapter attempts to analyze intergroup behavior through a phenomenological lens: examining how people perceive groups, their own and others, and how these perceptions shape subsequent behavior. Two individually based processes, categorization and egocentrism, and two group-based processes, competition over scarce recourses and strivings for positive social identities, allow intergroup hostilities and biases to flourish. Two strategies for reducing intergroup tension, both of which involve transforming representations of the out-group, are discussed. One is a group-based strategy, which involves structurally altering the relationship between groups by increasing their interdependence. The other strategy, perspective-taking, is individually based. Perspective-taking increases out-group evaluations, decreases stereotyping, and decreases the

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selection of expectancy-consistent information, all through activation and application of the self-concept. Because many intergroup biases are rooted in individual psychological processes, such as categorization and egocentrism, it is suggested that strategies designed to reduce intergroup tensions that build off these biases might be particularly effective. Implications of intergroup conflict and perspective-taking for organizations are discussed.

INTRODUCTION

What creates the conditions that sow and spread intergroup conflict? And how can these conditions be contained and curtailed; how can enmities and competition recede into trust and cooperation? The selling in 1984 of Lehman Brothers to Shearson-American Express demonstrates how intergroup conflict and stereotyping can lead to organizational debilitation (Auletta, 1985a, b). Before Lehman Brothers was sold a war broke out within the organization between the bankers and the traders over compensation and organizational control. Tension over the allocation of bonuses led to bitter feelings and rampant stereotyping between the bankers and the traders. For example, the traders interpreted long lunches of bankers as signs of laziness and lack of organizational commitment without realizing these lunches served the purpose of working with clients in order to generate business and capital. These intergroup tensions reduced the ability of the overall organization to function efficiently and ultimately cost Lehman Brothers its sovereign status. What caused this intergroup conflict between bankers and traders to escalate and what strategies, group and individually based, could have reduced the tension and allowed Lehman Brothers to retain its independent viability?

This chapter attempts to analyze intergroup behavior through a phenomenological lens – examining how people perceive groups, their own and others, and how these perceptions shape subsequent behavior. As Stablein points out in his contribution to this volume, the phenomenological approach starts with the realization that to appreciate any phenomenon (individual or group) one must understand human consciousness. To analyze behavior, one must recognize consciousness is characterized by intentionality; it is directed toward and open to the meaning of objects (e.g. individuals and intragroup processes) and the relationships among objects (e.g. intergroup processes). In addition, the phenomenological approach recognizes that the social objects do not possess an objective state independent of the meaning placed on it through the perception and categorization process. Perception and construal are the arbiters of human meaning and thus meaning is both constructed and inherently subjective. People attempt to make sense of their own behavior and the behavior

of others, and this sensemaking is critical to understanding the performance of individuals, groups, and organizations (Weick, 1995).

A crucial mechanism of imparting meaning is the categorization process. How we categorize an object and where we draw boundaries between objects help determine their meaning. One of the most basic forms of categorization is between "us" and "them". The tendency for individuals to organize themselves into discrete groups and to act according to group membership was documented at the turn of the century by Sumner (1906). He used the term "in-group" to refer to groups to which a particular individual belongs and the term "out-group" to the myriad groups to which the individual does not belong. Intergroup conflict is steeped in how individuals come to represent themselves, their in-group and their out-groups, and it is these representations that help make up the phenomenological experience of being a part of a group and being against other groups. Because out-groups, and thus intergroup hostilities, can come from both within as well as from outside organizations, a full understanding of organizational and group effectiveness must take into the account the causes and contexts that reduce and exacerbate tension between groups, and the individual psychological mechanisms involved.

In this chapter, I explore the ebbing and flowing of intergroup conflict. Before discussing theoretical explanations for causes of intergroup conflict, I explore how intergroup conflict can emerge from individual psychological processes of categorization. Next, I discuss a variety of strategies used to temper intergroup bias that alter the structural relationships between groups. Finally, I detail some of the recent work I have conducted looking at the role of an individual strategy, perspective-taking, in affecting stereotyping and in improving out-group evaluations. I have found converging evidence that the effectiveness of perspective-taking is mediated by the activation and application of the self-concept during perspective-taking.

EGOCENTRISM, ETHNOCENTRISM, AND STEREOTYPING: THE COGNITIVE BUILDING BLOCKS OF INTERGROUP CONFLICT

One reason that perception contributes to division is the fact that individuals tend to be egocentric – individuals are aided by a wealth of self-serving biases (Miller & Ross, 1975). We think we are smarter, more generous, friendlier than others. We also tend to overattribute malevolent intention and motives to others (Kramer, 1994). In addition, we like those who similar to us – those that possess our traits, our predilections, out propensities – and we distrust those who are different (Byrne & Griffith, 1973).

This suspicion of differences is exacerbated in intergroup contexts, where egocentrism becomes ethnocentrism (Turner, 1987). In fact, the mere presence of groups can often lead to strife and ethnocentric tendencies (Insko & Schopler, 1998). Ethnocentrism refers to the attachment to and preferences for the in-group over the out-group. Sumner (1906, p. 12) defined ethnocentrism as a form of egocentrism for groups, as "the technical name for the view of things in which one's own group is the center of everything . . . Each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior . . . and looks with contempt on outsiders." Thus, ethnocentrism is not limited to ascribed group categories such as ethnicity or sex, but applies to any situation in which individuals are separated into distinct groups, even within an organization.

Many attributional processes that appear for individual judgments also occur for group judgments. Miller and Ross (1975) pointed out that attributions for success and failure tend to be self-serving – individuals attribute their successes to their dispositions and other internal qualities, but explain away failures by externalizing them. These egocentric attributions become ethnocentric ones in groups, what has been dubbed the ultimate attribution error (Pettigrew, 1979). Successes and positive behaviors by the in-group and failures by the out-group are attributed to internal qualities, whereas causality for failures and negative behaviors by the in-group and successes by the out-group is found to reside in the situation. In addition, behaviors by in-group member and out-group members are spontaneously described in very different ways. Positive behaviors by the in-group and negative behaviors by the out-group tend to be described using abstract generalities (e.g. "he is a hostile person"), which imply enduring, invariant qualities. Negative behavior by the in-group and positive behaviors by the out-group tend to be described in terms of the specific, concrete behaviors (e.g. "he pushed the other person"), implying that the behavior was self-contained with little diagnostic value for the type of person the actor is (Maass, Salvi, Arcuri & Semin, 1989). Evidence for the notion that ethnocentrism is an extension of egocentrism to groups comes from the fact that in-group favoritism is partly the result of individuals extending their positive self-evaluations to encompass their in-groups (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996). The categorization of people into out-groups and in-groups fundamentally alters the way that information is processed and the type and valence of evaluations and judgments.

Out-groups are not only evaluated negatively, but they are also stereotyped and homogenized. Stereotypes, a set of specific attributes ascribed to a group and imputed to its members (Fiske, 1998), are a natural extension of basic categorization processes (Allport, 1954; Bruner, 1957; Fiske & Taylor, 1991). To stereotype is to categorize and to categorize is to perceive (Allport, 1954). Stereotypes, as descriptive and prescriptive expectancies, are often activated

non-consciously and automatically – without awareness or intention (Bargh, 1999; Devine, 1989). Once activated, stereotypes provide individuals with an interpretive frame for understanding subsequent information and forming impressions. This interpretive frame produces the meaning of behavior and the subsequent phenomenological experience of evaluation. Although as cognitive structures, stereotypes can be useful cognitive tools – they are efficient, as they simplify judgments and free up cognitive resources for other concurrent tasks (Macrae, Milne & Bodenhausen, 1994b) – stereotypes can bias a wide range of judgments, from courtroom verdicts (Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985) to employee promotion decisions (Fiske, Bersoff, Borgida, Deaux et al., 1991) and even produce stereotype-consistent behaviors through the process of self-fulfilling prophecies (Word, Zanna & Cooper, 1974; Chen & Bargh, 1997). Stereotypes lead perceivers to see ambiguous behaviors in a stereotype-consistent way. For example, Duncan (1976) showed that ambiguously aggressive behaviors (one person shoving another person) were encoded as playful when performed by an in-group member (White male) and aggressive when performed by an out-group member (Black male). Stereotypes can make perceivers judge the intellectual performance of a member of a stereotyped group as inferior even when objective criteria do not warrant such a bleak assessment (Darley & Gross, 1983).

Stereotypes help justify and perpetuate social injustice and inequality between groups (Jost & Banaji, 1994). The Supreme Court in *Hopkins vs. Price Waterhouse* recognized, for example, that gender-based stereotyping could result in unequal outcomes in organizational settings (Fiske et al., 1991). In that particular case, a woman was denied partnership, despite evidence of superior job performance (she brought in more than $40 million to the firm), because her behavior did not conform to gender-based expectations. Stereotypes are particularly influential when decisions are based on qualitative, idiosyncratic dimensions (i.e. interpersonal skill) than on quantitative features (i.e. amount of business brought into a firm). In this case it was the same behavior (assertiveness) that both increased job performance and violated gender expectancies.

Ethnocentrism and stereotyping appear to be rooted in individual psychological processes of perception and categorization and thus are inherently phenomenological. I next turn to some of the specific ways and means that conflict can flare between groups.

THE CAUSES OF INTERGROUP CONFLICT

Theories of intergroup relations are concerned with the interactions, attitudes, feelings and behavior that are embedded in an intergroup context. Taylor and

Moghaddam (1987, p. 6) defined intergroup relations as "any aspect of human interaction that involves individuals perceiving themselves as members of a social group, or being perceived by others as belonging to a social category."

Realistic Conflict Theory

One of the most influential explanations for intergroup conflict, *realistic conflict theory*, suggests that intergroup hostilities stem from incompatible interests and goals between groups, with the incompatibility fostered by scarcity of resources (Levine & Campbell, 1972). That is, competition over some resource, whether it is money, land, attention, glory, etc., leads to conflict. Incompatibility of goals leads to prejudiced attitudes, reliance on stereotypes, attributional biases, and hostile behavior. This scarcity of resources can emerge within an organization, as it did with the battle over partner bonuses at Lehman Brothers, and between organizations.

Sherif (1966) embarked on a groundbreaking series of studies to look at the development, maintenance, and resolution of intergroup conflict. In one study, Sherif allowed boys at a camp to freely interact with each other and form interpersonal ties and friendships. After friendships had stabilized, the boys were separated into two separate cabins such that two thirds of each boy's friends were in the other cabin. Friendship became the province of in-groups and former ties were sacrificed for in-group solidarity. The switching of the boys in the cabins relocated the categorization boundaries and hence the friendships. Phenomenologically the feelings of friendship shift effortlessly and quickly to enmity when an in-group member is recategorized as an out-group member.

In order to explore that the conditions that would lead to intergroup behavior, a situation in which "individuals belonging to one group interact, collectively or individually, with another group or its member in terms of their group membership" (Sherif, 1966, p. 12). Sherif et al. (1961) sequestered another group of eleven year old boys, all strangers to one another, in a camp site in Robber's Cave State Park in Oklahoma. The boys arrived and participated in a number of group building exercises and after there was sufficient evidence of group formation (the establishment of status and leadership hierarchies, group symbols and names, nicknames for group members, and rituals) the group became aware that another group existed in the camp. When each group merely became aware of the presence of the other group, its competitive spirit increased. Intergroup competitions led to out-group derogation and guerrilla actions against and sabotage of the other group. This intergroup context changed the group dynamics and concerns of the boys. The more aggressive boys were catapulted into leadership roles and there was great intolerance for discord

within the group. In these studies, intergroup conflict quickly escalated when the groups competed for coveted resources (points that accrued towards winning a trophy, medals and other prizes).

In the Robber's Cave studies, cognitions and behavior were fundamentally altered in the context of intergroup interactions. Insko and Schopler (1998) extended this work by demonstrating that intergroup relations tend to be more competitive and less cooperative than inter-individual relations. They label this phenomenon the *discontinuity effect* because the behavior of individuals in groups is discontinuous with their apparent beliefs and actions when isolated as individuals. The transformation of behavior when in groups suggests that groups create a distinct phenomenological experience. LeBon (1895/1960) discussed the competitive nature of groups and suggested hostilities perpetuate because individual cultivations are stripped away in crowds, reducing individuals to brutish behavior and barbaric acts. What accounts for this increased competition in groups? Like the work of Sherif, Insko and Schopler have explored the role of groups in augmenting the competitive spirit in the context of scarce of resources – many of their experiments have utilized the Prisoner's Dilemma Game. There is evidence that three processes bolster competition between groups. First, being in a group provides social support that assists in justifying behaviors that promote self and group interest. Because acting in a self-interested way demands some sort of explanation and justification (Miller, 1999), individuals need social support in order to engage in such behaviors, a social support that the other group members provide. Another aspect of being a member of a group that promotes competitive responses is that group membership decreases the ability of one's opponent to directed pointed fingers and accusations against the self when self-interested, competitive acts are taken by the group – when in a group one can diffuse responsibility from the self to the group as a whole. When resources are tantalizingly close, temptations are more likely to overwhelm an individual who is embedded in a group.

A third explanation revolves around not the presence of being in a group but the motivating effects of looking at group, rather than an individual, across the table. The mere presence of a group on the other side activates a schema built of fear and distrust. We distrust groups more than we distrust individuals (of course, the first two explanations suggest that we are right to distrust groups because they can increase claiming behaviors through provisions of social support and diffusions of responsibility). Insko and Schopler (1998) suggest that the discontinuity effect is driven by an ethnocentric schema about the prototypical out-group. There does appear to be a universal stereotype about out-groups that is based in suspicion (Levine & Campbell, 1972). Brewer and Campbell (1976) found across 30 separate ethnic groups in East Africa that

in-groups were considered to be trustworthy, cooperative, honest and peaceful, whereas out-groups were alleged to be untrustworthy, competitive, and aggressive. This schema organizes and steers memory and guides expectations for intergroup interaction. Expecting competition tends to increase competitive responses (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970), and thus intergroup interactions can quickly descend into self-fulfilling prophesies of struggle and conflict.

The Sherif et al. (1961) and the Insko and Schopler (1998) experiments suggest that when resources are scarce and their distribution must be negotiated, the presence of groups versus individuals promotes antagonism. Are scarce resources necessary for intergroup conflict to exist, or can intergroup hostilities spring from simply categorizing people into separate groups? In fact, merely dividing individuals into separate groups, even when basic competitive processes have been eliminated, can promote in-group favoritism and out-group hostilities (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament, 1971).

Social Identity Theory and Striving for Positive Self-Esteem

The discovery that the mere categorization of individuals into groups was sufficient to promote in-group bias led to the construction of social identity theory. Social identity theory assumes that individuals strive for positive identities – they wish to see themselves in a positive light. Ethnocentrism is rooted in a fundamental psychological process: the drive towards positive self-esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Because part of one's identity is defined in terms of group memberships, its social identity, there is a preference to see the in-group in a positive light. Tajfel (1978, p. 63) defined social identity as "that part of an individual's self concept which derives from his [or her] knowledge of his [or her] membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership."

Tajfel et al. (1971) originally set out to create a condition in which in-group favoritism would not occur and which could serve as a baseline for future experimental investigations. They tried to create a minimal group, one in which there was no history of rivalry, no competition for a scarce resource, and no previous acquaintanceship. Participants were categorized into groups based on trivial distinctions, such as a tendency to overestimate or underestimate the number of dots on a wall. The participants were asked to allocate rewards to other participants and the only information they had about the other participants was their group membership. Participants did not allocate any money to themselves, so self-interest could not account for the results. Participants consistently rewarded in-group members at the expense of the

out-group. Biases emerge in favor of the in-group following minimal group assignment whether individuals are allocating points or monetary values (Tajfel et al., 1971), or they are evaluating in- and out-group members on evaluative traits (Brewer, 1979; Locksley, Ortiz & Hepburn, 1980). Group formation and intergroup behavior had developed out of social categorization, independent of any of the conditions that had been present in the Sherif studies and typically associated with intergroup behavior. Because the categorization process is such a fundamental part of cognition, distinctions, even trivial ones, which separate individuals into groups, are enough to create intergroup behavior. From a phenomenological perspective, almost no group-based distinction is trivial.

Because social identities are included in the self, individuals seek to see the groups to which they belong in a positive light. In an intergroup context this striving for positive regard, for self-esteem, leads to ethnocentrism – positive distinctiveness can be maintained through exaggerated affection for the in-group or condemnations of out groups. Self-serving biases, or positive illusions, appear to be associated with high self-esteem and subjective well-being (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Attributional, ethnocentric biases have also been shown to enhance self-esteem (Crocker, Blaine & Luhtanen, 1993; Fein & Spencer, 1997). We give both ourselves and our fellow in-group members benefits of the doubt that allow for the implications of letdowns and defeats to slide off without incurring despair.

Social identity theory suggests that there exists an important relationship between the self and group. One explanation for the psychological favoring of an in-group is that individuals extend their positive self-representations to encompass their group (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; Smith & Henry, 1996). Because most people possess positive self-conceptions, the in-group can acquire positive valence through its association with the self (Otten & Moskowitz, 2000; Otten & Wentura, 1999). In-groups are assimilated to the self and out-groups are distanced from the self (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996). Cadinu and Rothbart presented evidence consistent with the hypothesis that in-group favoritism is a self-anchoring effect. Participants in their study demonstrated a stronger correlation between the self and in-group ratings when the self-ratings preceded the in-group ratings and they were more likely to generalize from the self to the in-group than vice-versa. Smith and Henry found that cognitive representations of the self and an in-group are directly linked, with facilitation for traits on which the self and in-group are similar and inhibition for traits involving self-group dissimilarity. The in-group gets accorded self-status, accruing all the benefits of being included in the self, from attributions to judgments.

DECREASING INTERGROUP HOSTILITIES

Intergroup bias, rooted in basic categorization processes, universal schemas, scarce resources, and self-esteem maintenance, is pervasive and ubiquitous. Reducing ethnocentrism has proved remarkably difficult. Given that the representations of the self, in-group and out-group help comprise the phenomenological experience of being in a group, reframing these representations may reduce intergroup conflict. One method of transforming these representations – diminishing the salience of the in-group/out-group distinction and altering the structural arrangements of the groups – has proved partially successful.

Group-Based Strategies: Superordinate Goals and Task Interdependence

The original Robber's Cave study was composed of three parts (Sherif et al., 1961). First, there was group formation, second intergroup competition, and finally intergroup cooperation. Sherif constructed the idea of a superordinate goal as a way to transform intergroup conflict into cooperation. Superordinate goals (Sherif, 1966, p. 89) are those "that have a compelling appeal for member of each group but that neither group can achieve without participation of the other." In the second stage, competition was required to achieve a desired goal. In the third stage, cooperation was necessary for the commonly shared goal to be achieved. Situations were constructed in which the boys had to combine resources in order to overcome an experimentally designed obstacle. For example, the groups came together to solve a breakdown in the water supply in one case, and helped start a truck carrying their precious food in another. Solving these tasks together transformed out-group evaluations over time. Mutual cooperation managed to reduce the rampant ethnocentrism that had ruled just a short time earlier.

In the Robber's Cave stage of cooperation, it is possible that the two groups had been fused into one-group based on the superordinate goals they now held – cooperation was not between two separate groups, but rather between individuals who were now one-group. Gaertner et al. (1989) utilized this notion of a common identity in trying to reduce intergroup bias. Gaertner et al. took two subgroups of three people and tried to recategorize the individuals' conceptual representations of the aggregate. In one of the experimental conditions they had the two subgroups take on a common name and spatially integrated the members. These participants, who perceived themselves to be more like one group and felt less like two groups then the other conditions, reduced

intergroup bias by increasing the attractiveness of the former out-group members. Dovidio, Gaertner, and Validzic (1998) have created the *common in-group identity model* to conceptualize these results. Because categorization is a basic component of mental life, they propose that recategorization can be more effective than decategorization in decreasing intergroup bias. By recategorizing the two separate groups as one group, former out-group member get the benefit of in-group biases. Decategorization, thinking of the two separate groups as six discrete individuals, reduces the attractiveness of the former in-group members without increasing affections towards the former out-group members. The creation of a superordinate identity, as well as the creation of a superordinate goal, can ameliorate hostilities between groups.

Other research suggests the individuation of out-group members – if interactions are person-based rather than category base – reduces intergroup biases (Brewer, 1988; Miller & Brewer, 1986). When social categories (e.g. stereotypes) are applied, out-group members are treated as undifferentiated representatives of the social category, rather than as individuals with unique characteristics. Thus, the disclosure of personal information about out-group members, which demonstrate their individuality and show that that there exists variance within the group, can improve out-group evaluations (Wilder, 1978). Being interdependent with an out-group member can reduce stereotyping and negative evaluations by leading an individual to seek out individuating information about that out-group person. Neuberg and Fiske (1987) found that task-oriented outcome dependency led individuals to base their impressions of an out-group member on his/her particular attributes, even under conditions that typically lead people to rely on stereotypes. The mutual collaboration necessary for successful completion of an interdependent task promotes a desire for accurate knowledge of one's partner in order to anticipate their actions, and thus individuating information is utilized over stereotypes.

The above models of intergroup conflict reduction suggest the context and manner in which groups interact determine the cognitions and behavior of in-group members towards out-groups. One of the earliest theories of how to decrease intergroup bias was the contact hypothesis, which held that tension between groups could simply be reduced by bringing the groups into contact with each other (Allport, 1954). However, in order to reduce bias, Sherif et al. (1961) showed that groups must be engaged in cooperative, rather than competitive, tasks; bringing warring groups into close contact in the absence of a superordinate goal only served to increase, rather than decrease hostilities. Mere contact is often not enough to decrease intergroup tension. Brewer and Brown (1998) detailed four crucial conditions that are necessary for contact to ameliorate intergroup tensions. Group contact must involve some form of interdependent cooperation between

equal status participants who have the potential to become acquaintances (Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe & Ropp, 1997), with the above conditions based in a foundation of social and institutional support. Aronson and colleagues attempted to utilize these conditions (Aronson & Bridgeman, 1979; Aronson et al., 1978) in trying to improve evaluations that students felt towards those who had been recently integrated into their schools. They called this interdependent, cooperative learning environment the "jigsaw classroom." The fifth graders in these Texas and California schools were assigned to small racially mixed groups that were required to learn about a particular topic. Just as a jigsaw puzzle is broken into pieces, each of the kids was given unique information about a subtopic. In order to do well on the test, the students had to teach each other the material regarding their subtopics, thereby bringing the pieces of the puzzle together. These jigsaw classes produced better students with lower levels of prejudice and greater tolerance of the out-group members. Notice that the students were placed in a cooperative, interdependent learning environment that was supported by the school, given equal status and had the potential to become friends, the four conditions that Brewer and Brown detailed were necessary for contact to improve intergroup evaluations.

INDIVIDUALLY BASED STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING INTERGROUP CONFLICT

The above transformations of group representations involved structural alterations. Are there strategies that individuals can use to decrease intergroup tensions? An intuitively appealing strategy to prevent negative evaluations and stereotypes from affecting interactions and judgments is to actively try to prevent the stereotype form entering into consciousness and influencing behavior. Suppression, however, does not always meet with success. Because a representation of the to-be-suppressed thoughts must be held up as an object somewhere in awareness in order to deny such thoughts entrance into consciousness, the decision to engage in suppression ironically can increase the accessibility of the unwanted thoughts (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne & Jetten, 1994a). In addition, suppression maintains focus on group-level characteristics and the target as an instantiation of the group and can lead to distancing behaviors (Macrae et al., 1994). Thus, suppression prevents individuation.

Individual strategies that promote personalization and individuation of an out-group member should be more effective than suppression at reducing intergroup biases. In one experiment, a group of four individuals were categorized into two separate groups and the two groups engaged in a problem-solving task. In one condition, participants were instructed to stay task-focused during their

interactions. In the other condition, participants were given an opportunity to get to know each other before engaging in the task. Those in the task-oriented condition continued to manifest in-group bias, whereas those who were given an opportunity to personalize the out-group members showed a reduction in bias (Bettencourt, Brewer, Croak & Miller, 1992). Continued personalization of out-group members decreases the salience of the in-group/out-group distinction while increasing awareness of the diversity and variability within the out-group (Brewer & Miller, 1988).

Perspective-Taking

There exists an individual strategy for reframing group representations through personalization: perspective-taking, the active consideration of another's point of view and the situation that person faces. The ability to entertain the perspective of another has long been recognized as a critical ingredient in proper social functioning. Davis (1983) found that perspective-taking, as measured by an individual difference measure, was positively correlated with both social competence and self-esteem. Early research showed that perspective-takers' emotional experience comes to resemble that of the targets, which leads perspective-taker to offer greater assistance to the target (see Batson, 1991).

Perspective-taking has been shown to affect attributional thinking and evaluations of others. Jones and Nisbett (1987) noted that actors and observers differ in the attributions they make. The actors' attributions recognize situational forces pulling and pushing behavior in systematic ways, whereas observers rely on others' dispositions as the explanation for behavior. Regan and Totten (1975) demonstrated that the psychological shifting of perspectives could turn dispositional explanations into situational ones. Perspective-takers made the same attributions for the target that they would have made if they had found themselves in that situation.

Perspective-taking has been shown to lead to a merging of the self and the other, in which the perspective-taker's thoughts towards the target become more "selflike" (Davis, Conklin, Smith & Luce, 1996). Following perspective-taking, there is a greater self-target overlap, such that greater percentage of self-descriptive traits are ascribed to the target. The representation of the target constructed by the perspective-taker comes to resemble the perspective-taker's own self-representation. In line with this, perspective-taking covaries with perceived similarity to targets (Cialdini et al., 1997; Davis et al., 1996)

In explaining the effects of perspective-taking, researchers have attempted to tease apart the differences between imagining how another person feels and imagining how you would feel if you were in the target's position. Imagining

the self in the target's perspective is more likely to spontaneously occur than imagining how another person is uniquely affected by the situation confronting that person. The probability of perspective-taking increases when one has endured the situation as the target person. Clore and Jeffrey (1972) found that traveling around campus in a wheelchair increased sensitivity to the plight of the handicapped. Prior experience with a difficult situation or the realization that one will confront a similar situation in the future increases empathic responding (Batson et al., 1996).

Given that perspective-taking produces many positive interpersonal benefits – even if egoistically motivated – these benefits may extend to intergroup judgments and interaction. The increased self-other overlap following perspective-taking has implications for intergroup relations because it is the in-group's association with the self that leads to ethnocentric responses in favor of the in-group (Smith & Henry, 1996; Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996). As the merging of self and in-group increases, so to does the favoritism in favor in the in-group (Turner, 1987). Just as the positive evaluation of the self extends to the in-group, the increased self-other overlap following perspective-taking could lead to more positive evaluations of an out-group member, which, in turn, might then generalize to the group as a whole. That is, taking the perspective of an out-group member should lead to a creation of a cognitive representation of the out-group that now overlaps with the participants' own self-representation (Davis et al, 1996). As the level of overlap between the self and out-group increases so should the positivity of out-group evaluations. This reduction of intergroup bias, although it has its roots in the egocentric self should help reduce a number of biases associated with intergroup contexts (Batson et al., 1997; Cialdini et al., 1997; Galinsky, 1999; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000).

Thus perspective-taking takes advantage of the very cognitive processes that produce the biases in the first place. Implicitly activating the self-concept during perspective-taking increases the probability that the self-concept will be applied to the out-group. In addition the shifting of attributions during perspective-taking suggests that perspective-taking increases individuation and personalization, which have been shown to increase evaluations of out-group members (Brewer, 1988; Wilder, 1978; 1986). The perspective-taker will phenomenologically experience the positivity of the evaluations but not the egocentric causes.

Perspective-Taking and Out-Group Evaluations

Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000) sought to test whether perspective-taking could transform out-group representations. We utilized the minimal group paradigm

and brought participants into the lab and had them engage in a dot estimation task in which they were asked to estimate the number of dots that appeared on a computer. Following this task, the computer provided feedback that informed participants that they consistently tended to overestimate the number of dots presented. Participants were told that each style of estimation does not relate to the accuracy of judgments, but simply represents different patterns of responding.

After the feedback, participants in the perspective-taking condition were asked to imagine what it would be like to be member of the other group, to be an underestimator. They were told to write a day in the life of an underestimator, all the while taking that person's perspective.

In addition to a control condition, another condition was included to rule out the possibility that the perspective-taking manipulation simply calls into question the validity of the group label, rather than affecting intergroup evaluations by increasing self/out-group overlap in representations. In this condition, participants were asked to recall a recent experience where they estimated something in the direction opposite to their estimation tendency, a time when they underestimated something.

Next, participants rated the two groups along ten different positive dimensions (considerate, cooperative, friendly, generous, honest, kind, loyal, sincere, trustworthy, understanding) considered to be desirable in a valued group member (Brewer, 1979). Participants not only rated how well each trait describes both groups, but they also assigned a valence or "favorability rating" to each trait. This favorability rating afforded a great opportunity to demonstrate how the meaning of a concept could be altered both depending on the group context (i.e. in-group or out-group) and through perspective-taking. Given that the heart of the phenomenological approach is that meaning is attached to objects, changes in the connotative meaning of a concept depending on the group context is a demonstration of the phenomenological changes that intergroup contexts produce. Esses and Zanna (1995) found that evaluative meaning of traits often change when describing out-group members. For example, intelligence when describing Jews (when they are an out-group) may be interpreted negatively as conniving. With regard to groups-based evaluations (Brewer, 1979), loyal may be considered positively when describing the in-group, but take on negative connotations, such as clannish or exclusionary, when describing the out-group. This shifting of meaning depending on whether a behavior is executed by the in-group or the out-group occurred in the Robber's Cave studies. The boys in that study became intensely obsessed with notions of justice and fairness, while interpreting all events in an egocentric way: any defeat was the result of injustice, a desecration of the rule of law, whereas all victories were the logical

outcome of an ordered universe. Brewer (1979) points out that most behaviors will be celebrated as fair when undertaken by the in-group, but denounced as unjust when executed by the out-group.

Across both the trait ratings and the favorability ratings, perspective-taking was the only condition to decrease intergroup bias. Specifically, perspective-taking improved out-group evaluations, increasing ratings of the out-group to a level comparable to that of the in-group. The results suggest that perspective-taking increases the evaluations of the out-group through the creation of a cognitive representation of the out-group that now overlaps with the participants' own self-representation, rather than through calling into question the validity of the group label. In addition, the results provide further evidence that taking the perspective of a specific individual can affects representations of the group as a whole (Batson et al., 1997).

Perspective-taking eliminated the shifting of the evaluative meaning of group relevant traits, maintaining the positive implications of the words when rating the connotative meaning in the context of the out-group. The in-group tends to be suspicious and have tacit distrust of any positive behaviors by the out-group, regardless of their genuineness (Insko & Schopler, 1998; Levine & Campbell, 1972). For perspective-takers, kind behaviors by the out-group are taken at face value, as a sign of authentic positive regard. Perspective-taking eliminated the shifting in meaning when going from in-group to out-group judgments, eliminating the phenomenological experience of considering an out-group against the in-group.

Perspective-Taking and Stereotypic Expectancies

The minimal group experiment explored the role of perspective-taking in affecting evaluations of out-groups when no content is known about a group, when there is no integrated construct used to describe the group, such as a stereotype. Would perspective-taking improve evaluations in the context of stereotypes? Stereotypes tend to be overgeneralizations that are either inaccurate or do not apply to the individual in question and they create expectations about how the person will and should act. Like other expectations, individuals seek to confirm their stereotypes, both wittingly and unwittingly (Olson, Roese & Zanna, 1996).

Stereotyped targets are often treated in an expectancy-consistent manner, regardless of whether they possess any of the traits deemed to be typical of their social group. In fact, stereotypical responses by targets are often elicited by perceivers, leading to the unwitting fulfillment of perceivers' expectancies. Word, Zanna & Cooper (1974) found that White interviewers treated Black

interviewees with less immediate nonverbal behaviors (e.g. less eye contact, further interpersonal distance) while also constructing fewer grammatically correct questions compared to White interviewees. When White interviewers were trained to treat other White interviewees in the same manner that the Black applicants had been treated, the performance of these White applicants suffered – they made more grammatical errors, responded less eloquently and confidently. In addition, individuals are often unaware that it is their own behavior that often constrains and induces expectancy-consistent behaviors in targets. In fact, participants are just as likely to infer dispositional qualities from the constrained behavior of targets when they are the origins of that constraint (Gilbert & Jones, 1986). White interviewers will often only notice that poor interview performance of the Black interviewees and make dispositional inferences of low ability, without noticing that it was their own distancing behaviors which produced the poor performance.

I explored whether perspective-taking could decrease the search of expectancy-confirming information (Galinsky, 2000a). I found that taking the perspective of a person for whom an expectancy was held reduced the tendency to selectively confirm one's expectancy. Actively taking the perspective of what it is like to be the object of the expectancy reduced the search for expectancy-confirming information and increased the search for expectancy-disconfirming information. Placing oneself in the position of this other increases awareness of constraint and reduces and slackens the implementation of that constraint. This suggests that perspective-taking holds promise of reducing self-fulfilling prophecies and the perpetuation of discrimination. In another series of studies, I found that perspective-taking increased awareness of situational constraints against an out-group (Galinsky, 2001). In the Lehman Brothers example described earlier, had the traders given a situational explanation (recruiting business) for the bankers' behavior (long lunches) rather than dispositional derision (lazy), it might have gone a long way towards ameliorating the brewing tension. Perspective-taking makes situational constraints phenomenologically present.

Perspective-Taking and Reducing Stereotyping

Because of the insidious nature of stereotypes, researchers have attempted to uncover situations and temporary goals that could reduce the accessibility of stereotypes. Stereotype accessibility is a reliable predictor of both discriminatory behavior and interpersonal distancing behaviors (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton & Williams, 1995). The link between the group representation and the stereotype can be severed by training participants to replace the stereotype with different

beliefs (Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen & Russin, 2000). Gollwitzer, Schaal, Moskowitz, Hammelbeck and Wasel (1999) demonstrated that the intention to be egalitarian, supplemented by practicing a egalitarian response to stereotypic targets, can control the activation of stereotypes. Perspective-taking is perhaps another useful processing strategy that temporarily dissipates the strength of the links between group representations and the stereotype.

How might perspective-taking decrease the accessibility and application of stereotypes? The increased accessibility of the self-concept following perspective-taking (Davis et al., 1996) might result in the use of the self-concept over the stereotypic construct when categorizing and evaluating a member of a stereotyped group. This should occur because categories in the mind compete with each other to win the metaphorical race to capture stimuli (Allport, 1954; Bruner, 1957). When two constructs are equally applicable for categorizing an individual, the more recently activated construct will be used. The winning category determines the meaning attached to the object of perception. Which category wins the race determines the phenomenological stance towards that object. For example, seeing an Asian woman putting on makeup increases the accessibility of the female stereotype while simultaneously inhibiting the Asian stereotype (Macrae, Bodenhausen & Milne, 1995). Thus, the increased accessibility of the self-concept might diminish the accessibility and application of the stereotype by becoming the dominant construct used to categorize a target.

Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000) explored the role of perspective-taking in affecting stereotyping. We contrasted perspective-taking with stereotype suppression as a possible strategy to control the use of stereotypes. To explore the differential effects of perspective-taking and suppression on stereotyping, we utilized the paradigm of Macrae et al. (1994). Participants were shown a photograph of an elderly man and asked to write a typical day in the life of the individual. Suppression participants were told to actively avoid thinking about the photographed target in a stereotypical manner. Perspective-takers were told to go through the day in the life of the target person as if they were that person, looking at the world through his eyes and walking through the world in his shoes. After writing the essays, the accessibility of the stereotype was measured.

Only suppression increased the accessibility of the stereotype. Perspective-takers showed evidence of stereotype inhibition, or decreased accessibility of the stereotype. These results suggest that perspective-taking is a useful strategy for controlling the activation of stereotypes. One problem with this conclusion that perspective-taking is a constructive alternative to suppression is that the previous experiment used a stereotype that is not particularly socially sensitive (the elderly) and one that most participants do not feel the need to inhibit under

ordinary conditions. Would the benefits of perspective-taking survive a more socially sensitive stereotype, such as that of African Americans? Galinsky and Moskowitz (2001) replicated the procedures from the Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000) procedures and also utilized a stereotype expression condition. Results showed that suppressors increased accessibility of the stereotype compared to even stereotype expressers, suggesting that suppression, as a strategy of mental control, reliably produces ironic and pernicious outcomes. Again, perspective-taking showed evidence of stereotype inhibition. The inhibition of the stereotype by perspective-taking should lead to few discriminatory behaviors and smoother interactions with stereotyped targets.

We did a second experiment to more clearly explicate the process by which the positive benefits of perspective-taking occur (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). Specifically, if the self-concept gets activated and brought on line then it could be used, rather than the stereotype, to categorize the target. Previous demonstrations that perspective-taking increased the amount of overlap between the self and the target of perspective-taking had only used individuals who were not from stereotyped groups (male participants took the perspective of a male target and female participants took the perspective of a female target). Would the ascription of self-relevant traits occur not only for target individuals but also for the group to which the target belonged? And would it occur if the target were a member of an out-group? We found that perspective-taking led to both decreased stereotyping and increased overlap between representations of the self and representations of an out-group, suggesting activation and application of the self-concept in judgments of this out-group. In addition, the reduction in stereotyping was mediated by the increased overlap in representations. The more a participant attributed self-defining traits to the out-group, the less likely that participant was to think of the out-group in a stereotypical fashion. The self-concept had won the race against the stereotype to categorize the target and the group.

Perspective-Taking and the Egocentric Self

Across manipulations of minimal groups and measures of stereotyping, perspective-taking appears to decrease bias by activating and applying the self to targets and groups. Although ethnocentrism is a natural extension of egocentrism, perspective-taking utilizes egocentric tendencies – the tendency to see the self in a favorable light – to reduce bias rather than increase it. This suggests that when the egocentric tendency breaks down, as it does with those with lowered self-esteem (Taylor & Brown, 1988), so should the benefits of perspective-taking.

Recently, I sought further evidence that perspective-taking involves the activation and application of the self-concept and that this activation determines how out-groups are evaluated (Galinsky, 2000b). These experiments tested the hypothesis that if perspective-taking activates the self-concept then the positivity of one's own self-evaluation should predict how positively a perspective-taker evaluates an out-group. In one experiment, positive and negative self-evaluations were activated by providing participants with positive or negative feedback prior to the perspective-taking manipulation. Participants were told that they demonstrated mediocre decision-making skills in predicting the attitudes of potential jury members. Following the feedback and before the perspective-taking condition, participants engaged in a Lego building task in order to separate the feedback from the perspective-taking manipulations and evaluations of the out-group. A different experiment looked at individual differences in self-evaluation, or self-esteem. In each of these experiments, participants wrote a day in the life of an elderly male in either a perspective-taking or control condition and then evaluated the elderly along a number of semantic differentials. In both experiments, the evaluation of the elderly depended on the participant's own self-evaluation for the perspective-takers but not for the control participants. Positive feedback and high self-esteem led perspective-takers to evaluate the out-group more positively compared to control participants. Negative feedback and low self-esteem, on the other hand, led perspective-takers to evaluate the out-group more negatively than did control participants.

Out-group evaluations are only improved when the perspective-taker's self-concept is positive; negative self-evaluations can lead perspective-takers to rate out-groups more negatively than control participants. For the perspective-taker, the self is a critical ingredient in affecting intergroup evaluations.

DISCUSSION

This chapter has reviewed the causes and consequences of, and potential routes for reducing intergroup conflict. The study of intergroup relations, the manner in which groups interact, has broad implications for groups and organizations. Organizational implications of intergroup conflict are particularly important to consider because of two recent trends in organizations: increased reliance on teams to accomplish work and the increased demographic diversity of workplaces. Both teams and diversity can increase organizational effectiveness through the pooling of the varied strengths of employees (Moreland, Levine & Wingert, 1996), but they can lead to increased conflict and decreased productivity as well. Conflict and stereotyping between groups in an organization and

between organizations can hinder the ability of an organization to maximize its potential.

How can organizations take advantage of the research on intergroup conflict in order to prevent the pitfalls that lurk in both teams and diversity? As both realistic conflict theory (Sherif, 1966) and social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) have noted, intergroup conflict can lead to intragroup solidarity. External threats promote group cohesion and social support within a group. Thus, intergroup conflict can have potential positive benefits if out-groups are strategically chosen. Creating a structure so that groups and teams within an organization compete with each other over scarce organizational rewards can lead to the same intergroup hostilities, from derisive name calling to sabotage, that Sherif (1966) observed. But constructing an out-group that is far enough removed can motivate performance and increase group solidarity. One potential problem of the drive toward group cohesion, however, is the fact that group decision-making can be hampered by groupthink (Janis, 1982), the situation in which unanimity and consensus are the overriding motivations in evaluating decisions. In addition, the competitiveness of group conflict, however appropriate the choice of the out-group, can lead to utility minimizing choices. Intergroup tension can lead people to prefer resource distributions that maximize the relative advantage over an out-group rather than maximizing outcomes for the in-group; competitive interest in amplifying differences between the in-group and out-group can lead to sub-optimal outcomes for the in-group (Tajfel, 1978; Thompson, Valley & Kramer, 1995).

How the organization is represented can help determine whether conflict or cooperation emerges. Creating a superordinate identity and goal that connect disparate work groups to larger organizational concerns can enable the benefits of groups and teams to emerge without the hindrances of intergroup conflict. The leaders of Lehman Brothers failed to create a sense of teamwork or overarching organizational goals and the partners were only held together by profits (Auletta, 1985a, b). At other times it may be necessary to re-represent two groups as belonging to one more inclusive group (Dovidio, Gaertner & Validzic, 1998). Organizational culture can also help determine if diversity is beneficial or detrimental (Williams & O'Reilly, 1998) to organizational effectiveness. Chatman et al. (1998) found that the benefits of diversity are more likely to emerge when the organizational culture emphasizes organizational identity over demographic identity.

Type of conflict can also be an important determinant of group and organizational effectiveness. In looking at the effects of conflict on work group outcomes, Jehn (1997) distinguished between two: task conflict and

relationship conflict. Relationship conflict focuses attention toward threat and power. Because energy is directed toward the interpersonal processes of the group, productivity suffers. Task conflict, on the other hand, increases group effectiveness by recruiting available but ignored to information that contradicts predictions and expectations. Relationship conflict is based in destructive criticism and task conflict is based in constructive criticism. These types of conflict have a number of implications for intergroup conflict. Scarcity of resources increases a sense of threat and therefore is likely to be associated with relationship conflict. In addition, social identity theory places enhancement of self-esteem as a critical motivator of intergroup interaction, a motivation that should increase the potential for relationship conflict. The two strategies discussed in this chapter for reducing intergroup conflict, increasing interdependence and perspective-taking, may encourage the transformation of relationship conflict into task conflict. Perspective-taking, for example may allow the implications of conflict to be less threatening, allowing for a cognitive appreciation, rather than emotional apprehension, of divergent viewpoints. In fact, Jehn, Northcraft, and Neale (1999) found that task interdependence reversed the typical relationship between social category diversity and satisfaction and group commitment, allowing diversity to enhance rather than impair experiences within the group.

Future research should consider what causes perspective-taking. Perceived similarity increases the probability that another's perspective will be taken (Cialdini et al., 1997), as does prior or anticipated experience with situation similar to that of another person (Batson et al., 1996). There are also discernable individual differences in the ability to engage in perspective-taking (Davis, 1983; Neale & Bazerman, 1983). Are there situational factors that can promote or prevent perspective-taking? Power appears to be an important predictor of both stereotyping (Fiske, 1993) and derogation of out-groups (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1991). In addition, Galinsky, Gruenfeld and Magee (2001) found that positions of elevated power often decrease perspective-taking. This further supports the notion that perspective-taking and stereotyping are inversely related. These results suggest that how power is distributed and displayed can be an important predictor of whether stereotyping and conflict or perspective-taking and the lessening of hostilities dominate interaction.

Apart from power, there are other important boundary conditions for the positive effects of perspective-taking to emerge. The beneficial outcomes of perspective-taking do not survive minimal manipulations; they require instructions that are especially vivid, process oriented and directive (Galinsky, 2000a; Galinsky & Mussweiler, in press). Hackman (1996), in reviewing the organizational behavior literature of team self-management, noted that effective

task completion requires the combination of a clear, engaging direction and explicit strategy options; knowledge of an end state combined with information on strategy effectiveness allows teams to become "self-correcting performance units." Likewise, instructions "to be unbiased" are ineffective in reducing propensities towards prejudice compared to instructions that specify a method and practice for achieving that state of impartiality (see also Lord, Lepper and Preston (1984) for a demonstration of this difference).

There are also biases inherent in perspective-taking; at times perspective-taking can increase favoritism. Perspective-taking can also conflict with other beliefs and norms, such as justice, fairness and equity. Because the target of perspective-taking gets accorded "favored" status, perspective-taking can lead to preferential treatment of the targets of perspective-taking (Batson, Klein, Highberger, & Shaw, 1995). Batson, Klein et al. argued that empathy induced altruism (the increased concern for the welfare of another) and morality (defined as the upholding of a given moral principle) should be considered independent social motives, because their participants altered a system of equal distribution to preferentially allocate resources to the target of empathy. In addition, perspective-taking can reduce overall contributions to the collective in a social dilemma paradigm by preferentially allocating resources to the target of empathy (Batson, Batson, Todd, Brummett, Shaw, & Aldeguer, 1995). Perspective-taking produces systematic effects that can result in positive or negative social outcomes depending on the context.

Finally, perspective-taking or task interdependence might not survive increased threats to the self or the group (Spencer, Fein, Wolf, Hodgson, & Dunn, 1998). If suspiciousness is high, because of scarce resources for example (Levine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif et al., 1961), then perspective-taking could increase mistrust of the out-group. In such a case, scheming by the in-group may be projected onto and attributed to the out-group (e.g. Kramer, 1994). Even the most well-intentioned efforts at perspective-taking might not survive severe deprivations.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has explored the creation and reduction of intergroup tensions. Because many intergroup biases are rooted in individual psychological processes, such as categorization and egocentrism, it was suggested that strategies designed to reduce intergroup tensions that build off these biases might be particularly effective. Thus, utilizing categorization principles suggests that out-group evaluations can be improved if representations of the aggregate (two groups) can be recategorized into one group (Gaertner et al., 1989).

Because in-group bias is partially perpetuated by individuals applying their own positive self-evaluations to encompass their in-group, strategies that activate and apply the self to the out-group should improve out-group evaluations. This is what happens during perspective-taking. Perspective-taking was shown to increase out-group evaluations, decrease stereotyping, and decrease the search for expectancy-consistent information, all through activation and application of the self-concept. Although ethnocentrism is in many ways egocentrism applied to groups, perspective-taking utilizes egocentric tendencies to reduce intergroup bias. Perspective-taking, despite and because of egocentric basis, holds the promise of reducing intergroup hostilities that continue to flourish.

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